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CASE NOTE
The Third Circuit's New Test Provides An Alternative To
Urning Secondary Meaning In The Market
INTRODUCTION
Protection for product design has largely been unavailable in the United
States.' For this reason, design protection has been called the orphan of Ameri-
can intellectual property law Although limited protection may be found under
copyright and patent law, a continued expansion of the scope of trademark law
seems to be filling this void.3 Throughout the last two decades, the federal dis-
trict courts have been reading section 43(a) of the Lanham Act expansively,
transforming this unfair competition provision into a judge-made design law.4
This Note examines an example of this expansion, Duraco Products, Inc. v.
Joy Plastic Enterprises,5 decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. The issue facing the court was whether the configuration of a product, in
contrast to its packaging, can ever constitute inherently distinctive trade dress.6
In an opinion by Judge Becker, the Third Circuit answered in the affirmative, but
only under very narrow circumstances. In reaching this result, the court rejected
the application of traditional trademark classifications to product configurations
and established a test to determine when a product configuration is inherently
distinctive.7 According to the court, an inherently distinctive product configura-
tion must be: 1) unusual and memorable; 2) conceptually separable from the
product; and 3) likely to serve primarily as a source designator
Part I of this Note discusses trademark law, reviews the existing protection
under unfair competition, and discusses relevant case law involving product
configuration under the Lanham Act. Part II sets out the factual and procedural
background of the issues raised in Duraco and details the reasoning of the opin-
ion. Part III examines the court's analysis of the protection issue, first addressing
1. J.H. Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evolution of Design Protection Law - A Com-
ment, 4 FoRDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ. 387, 388 (1993).
2. John Pegram, Trademark Protection of Product and Container Configurations, 81
TRADEMARK REP. 1 (1990).
3. Ralph Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1357-59 (1987).
4. Reichman, supra note 1, at 392.
5. 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
6. Id. at 1433-34.
7. Id. at 1448-49.
8. Id. at 1449.
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the analytical approach of Duraco's new test, and second, discussing the court's
rejection of the traditional trademark categories. Part III then discusses the broad-
er issues of protection for unlimited monopolies, and the public's perception of
the configuration of a product as an indicator of source.
This Note concludes that the Third Circuit has properly created guidelines that
raise the threshold for a finding of inherently distinctive product configurations.
The Third Circuit has attempted to develop a narrow exception for finding cer-
tain product configurations inherently distinctive and, in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.,9 free from the
requirement of proving secondary meaning in the market.' ° Although at first
blush it seems that the Third Circuit's test offers broad protection, attaching
inherent distinctiveness immediately, the application of this new test yields a
contrary result. The effect of Duraco is that very few, if any, product configura-
tions will meet this test. Therefore, those seeking protection will have to prove
secondary meaning in the market, placing the basis of trademark law protection
on the public's perception, a proposition on which trademark law has historically
relied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal Protection under the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act regulates the registration and protection of trademarks." A
trademark is a source indicator that efficiently conveys information about the
characteristics of the product and its source. 2 Consumers rely on trademarks to
aid them in two ways: to identify products that they have purchased previously
and to identify the source of the product, which they have come to associate with
a certain level of quality. 3 Under the Lanham Act, a trademark includes "any
word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof... [used] to identi-
9. 505 U.S. 763 (1992). The Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos modified one of the re-
quirements for trade dress infringement under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The Court held that the
decor of a Mexican restaurant, which was deemed inherently distinctive, did not have to show that it
had acquired secondary meaning in the market. Therefore, a plaintiff claiming protection under §
43(a) must only prove that: 1) the trade dress is distinctive, either because it is inherently distinctive
or because it has acquired secondary meaning; 2) the trade dress is not functional; and 3) the
defendant's use of plaintiff's trade dress is likely to cause consumer confusion. Id. at 769 (emphasis
added).
10. Secondary meaning is sometimes referred as acquired distinctiveness, and it is established
when the consumer makes a mental association relating the trademark of a product to a specific pro-
ducer. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987). See also Inwood
Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982) (Acquiring secondary meaning means
that "in the minds of the public, the primary significance of a [product's trademark or trade dress
must be] to identify the source of the product rather than the product itself."). See also infra text
accompanying notes 32-34.
11. Lanham Act §§ 1-46, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
12. Daniel J. Gifford, The Interplay of Product Definition, Design and Trade Dress, 75 MINN. L.
REV. 769, 773 (1991).
13. Id. at 775.
[Vol. VI:275
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fy and distinguish [a producer's] goods... from those manufactured or sold by
others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is un-
known."'4 Such an identifying feature, which in the eyes of the consuming pub-
lic distinguishes the product of a particular company, is distinctive. Classic
examples of distinctive trademarks are the marks KODAK, 6 EXXON,17 the
shape of Coca-Cola bottles," the color pink for fiberglass insulation, 9 the
pyramidal design of the Transamerica building,.' and the design of McDonald's
drive-in restaurants.2! '
There are four purposes for protecting trademarks under the Lanham Act.'
The Act's first goal is to protect consumers against confusion as to the source or
sponsorship of goods or services. Second, the Act promotes competition by
helping consumers compare and distinguish among competing products and ser-
vices.24 In this sense, a trademark reduces the cost of information in the market-
place by giving the consumer "shorthand means" to recognize that particular
manufacturer or sponsor.' This shorthand also carries the characteristics and
qualities of the goods or services that the consumer wishes to obtain or refrain
from obtaining. 6 Third, the Lanham Act encourages fair competition by pro-
scribing "fraudulent representations about goods and services and the 'passing
off' of one person's goods or services as those of another."27 Lastly, the federal
statute safeguards the producer's interests in its goodwill and reputation acquired
through promotion and customer satisfaction.s This federal protection seeks to
14. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
15. 1 J. THoMAs MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETrTION § 2.01, at 2-3 (Rel. 29,
6/93). This quality is also known as "source indicativeness."
16. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakov, 739 F. Supp. 116 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that Kodak is
one of the most distinctive marks in the country).
17. See Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy Resources, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
18. U.S. Trademark Regis. No. 696,147, Aug. 12, 1960. See also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, §
7.31, 7-180 to 7-181 (Rel. 3, 12/94).
19. In re Owens-Coming Fiberglass Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
20. Gary N. Hardiman, Buildings as Trademarks, AIARCHITECr, Aug. 1995, at 18.
21. See McDonald's Corp. v. Moore, 243 F. Supp. 255 (S.D. Ala. 1965), affd per curiam, 363
F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
22. Jay Dratler, Trademark Protection for Industrial Designs, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 887, 926
n.208 (1988). Dratler discusses the known goals of the statute even though there is a disagreement on
how to state them. For example, the Lanham Act lists five goals as the "intent" of the Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1988). In Park N'Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985), the Su-
preme Court has stated that there are two rationales in trademark law. Further, in Scarves by Vera v.
Todo Imports, Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1976), the court held that there are three interests
in trademark law in cases of noncompeting products.
23. Dratler, supra note 22, at 926.
24. Id.; See S. RFP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1274, 1275 ("Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a
choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other.").
25. Dratler, supra note 22, at 926; W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, Inc., 778 F.2d 334, 338-39 (7th
Cir. 1985).
26. Dratler, supra note 22, at 926.
27. Id. at 927. See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
28. Dratler, supra note 22, at 927. See S. REP. No. 1333, supra note 24, at 1, reprinted in 1946
27719961
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foster competition and quality control by pledging the benefits of a good repu-
tation to the producer.29
Under the Act, the term "trademark" includes the amorphous concept of
"trade dress."' Traditionally, trade dress referred to the packaging or labeling
of goods;31 however, it has evolved to refer to the composite image of a prod-
uct, which may include different features such as the product's size, shape, color
or color combinations, texture, graphics, or the particular techniques used in
selling the product.32 The term has also been recognized to include the config-
uration of the product itself.33 The rationale behind the federal protection of a
product's trademark applies equally to a product's trade dress because both per-
form the same informational function that aims to protect the purchaser and the
producer.34 In other words, a product's trade dress can carry the same informa-
tion about its source in the same manner as a trademark.
The Lanham Act requires that a trademark be "distinctive" in order to merit
protection.35 Both trademarks and trade dress can be classified into different
categories along a "distinctiveness spectrum," '36 and the protection afforded is
related to the strength of the mark. 7 The distinctiveness categories, in order of
increasing distinctiveness, are: 1) generic; 2) descriptive; 3) suggestive; and 4)
arbitrary or fanciful.'
First, a generic mark is the common descriptive name of a product;39 it does
not receive protection and can never be registered. If generic marks were actually
allowed protection, competitors would not be able to accurately and efficiently
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1274 ("[W]here the owner of a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in
presenting to the public the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by
pirates and cheats.").
29. Park N'Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
30. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 8.01[2], 8-5 to 8-10 (Rel. 3, 12/94).
31. Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987).
32. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d 1531, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing John H. Harland Co.
v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987). But
see Prufrock v. Lasater, 781 F.2d 129, 131-32 (8th Cir. 1986)(method and style of conducting busi-
ness excluded from definition of trade dress).
33. See, e.g., LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that
"the design of a product itself may function as its packaging, serving to distinguish it from other
products, and hence be protectable trade dress"); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d
1210 (8th Cir.) (unique exterior design of twin hopper bottomed grain semi-trailer protected under §
43(a)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
34. Gifford, supra note 12, at 773-74.
35. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2.01, at 2-3.
36. The distinctiveness spectrum was formulated by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co.
v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
37. Martin Hoffman, TRADE DREsS/PRoDUCr SIMULATToN OvERvIEw C913, ALI-ABA 219, 221
(1994).
38. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9.
39. A generic name may be a common dictionary entry such as "cereal," "soap or "journal," or
it may be a former trademark which like, "aspirin" or "linoleum" has been assimilated into the lan-
guage as a common name. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2.01, at 2-4.
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describe their products, therefore stifling competition. °
Second, a descriptive mark may receive protection only after it acquires dis-
tinctiveness.4" A mark acquires distinctiveness when it has gained "secondary
meaning" in the market. 2 Secondary meaning refers to the mental association
made by the consumer relating the trademark of a product to a specific produc-
er,"3 and it can be proved by continuous and exclusive use in commerce over a
period of time, generally measured in years." From a practical standpoint, sec-
ondary meaning refers to the time and effort invested by the producer in placing
its product in the marketplace.
Third, a suggestive mark, as its name implies, does not describe a product.
Rather, it suggests a characteristic of the product. A suggestive mark requires the
consumer's imagination in making the connection between the mark and an
attribute of the product.' Suggestive marks can be protected without proof of
secondary meaning."
Lastly, an arbitrary or fanciful mark receives the most protection because its
only function is to directly identify and distinguish the goods that bear that
mark.' Unlike generic and descriptive marks, arbitrary or fanciful marks do not
declare "the nature, quality, characteristics, or ingredients of the products with
which they are used,"' and unlike suggestive marks, they do not require that
the observer or listener "use imagination or perception to determine the nature of
the goods."'9 Arbitrary or fanciful marks are generally invented and do not
yield any information about the product or its use ° In fact, sometimes common
terms are arbitrarily used to denote the product's source
The latter two categories, suggestive marks and arbitrary or fanciful marks,
are considered "inherently distinctive" and are automatically entitled to protection
because the consuming public naturally understands them as designations of
origin5 2 Inherently distinctive marks may be registered with the Patent and
Trademark Office and receive the most protection under the Ac. 5 The purpose
40. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 116-19 (1938).
41. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993).
42. Id.
43. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc. 814 F.2d 346, 348 (7th Cir. 1987).
44. Section 2 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C § 1052(f), requires five years of exclusive use in
commerce as prima facie evidence that the mark has become distinctive.
45. OfficialAirline Guides, 6 F.3d at 1391. See also 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2.01, at 2-11
(citing examples of suggestive marks such as CATERPILLAR for tractors and D1TTO for copying
machines).
46. Thompson Medical Co. v. Pfizer Inc., 753 F.2d 208, 216 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. Id., § 3.01(1], at 3-2 (Rel. 1, 12/93).
48. Dratler, supra note 22, at 902.
49. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc., 873 F.2d 985 (7th Cir. 1989).
50. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 2.01, at 2-10 (citing examples of arbitrary and fanciful marks
such as KODAK for film, and EXXON and CITGO for gasoline).
51. Id., §§ 2.01, 2-10 to 2-11 (citing examples such as GODIVA for candy, CAMEL for ciga-
rettes, SHELL for gasoline and 4711 for cologne).
52. Id., § 2.01, at 2-9.
53. Id., § 2.01, at 2-11.
1996]
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of federal registration is to give notice of a mark's use. Registration also serves
as evidence of the mark's validity.54 When a producer uses another's registered
trademark or trade dress, he may be liable for trademark infringement under
section 32 of the Act.55
B. Protecting Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Federal trademark protection is not limited to registered marks. Section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act creates a federal cause of action for unfair competition.' An
unregistered mark or trade dress may find protection under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, which prohibits the use of false designations of origin.57 In either
a trademark infringement claim under section 32 or a claim for unfair competi-
tion under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a party seeking federal protection
makes a prima facie case by showing that the unauthorized use of a similar mark
by another is likely to confuse purchasers about the source of the product.'8 A
false designation of origin is considered unfair competition. The underlying poli-
cy of unfair competition law allows a manufacturer to prevent others from creat-
ing a likelihood of confusion by making their goods look like those of the first
manufacturer.59 A competitor's use of confusingly similar trade dress can con-
stitute a "false description or representation of fact," thereby triggering section
43(a) liability.' Trade dress infringement, like trademark infringement, is a type
of unfair competition, derived from the common law tort of "passing off."6 '
Because section 43(a) has a strong basis in the common law, it is "the only pro-
vision in the Act that protects an unregistered mark" 2 and proscribes a range of
practices broader than the prohibition against infringement of registered marks.'
54. Lanham Act §§ 2(d), 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(d), 1125.
55. 15 U.S.C. § 1114.
56. Two Pesos, Inc., v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780-81 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring);
W.T. Rogers Co. v. Keene, Inc., 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
58. Lois Sportswear, Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986); Dratler, supra
note 22, at 896.
59. Brown, supra note 3, at 1358.
60. Chevron Chem. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 1981).
Further, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), states:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false
or misleading representation of fact, which ... is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with
another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services
or commercial activities by another person.., shall be liable in a civil action by any
person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
61. Chevron, 659 F.2d at 701 (stating that when a producer "passes off" his goods as those of
another he deceives the consumers while taking advantage of another's goodwill).
62. 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 27.03[I][b], at 27-23 (Rel. 2, 4/94) (citing Centaur Commu-
nications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217 (2d Cir. 1987)).
63. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs. Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 858 (1982). Section 43(a) of the Lanham
[Vol. VI:275
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In the last two decades, trade dress protection under the rubric of unfair com-
petition has experienced remarkable expansion. The broad umbrella of section
43(a) of the Lanham Act has afforded protection to a wide variety of types of
trade dress. To succeed in a section 43(a) action against unprivileged imita-
tion, the plaintiff must establish that the imitated feature or overall combination
of features meets the following three elements:' 1) distinctiveness - the trade
dress must identify and distinguish its source to consumers;' 2) non-functional-
ity - the trade dress cannot be generated by utilitarian concerns;67 and 3) like-
lihood of confusion - the unauthorized imitation is likely to confuse consumers
about the product's source or sponsorship.' Further, in a trade dress in-
fringement claim, the court compares the overall impression of the parties'
goods, including the products and their packaging, labeling, and advertising.'
The combination of features must be considered as a whole."
An important development in section 43(a) case law was the Supreme Court's
1992 landmark decision in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc."1 Prior to Two
Pesos, the federal appellate courts were split as to the requirements to meet the
Act has been applied to trade dress, false advertisement, disparagement, passing off, and unregistered
marks, see generally 3 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 27.03[l][b], 27-22 to 27-25 (Re. 2 4/94). Fur-
ther, only those unregistered marks that qualify for registration in the Federal Register are eligible for
§ 43(a) protection. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 767-68.
64. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (the theme and design
of a Mexican restaurant); Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (the design of a fau-
cet and faucet lever); Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (the
design of a blender); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobili e Corse v. Roberts Motors Co.,
944 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (the exterior of a sports automobile); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel
Co., 832 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1987) (the shape of a fishing reel); AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 812 F.2d
1531 (1th Cir. 1986) (the wrapper of an ice cream bar); and In re Morton Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332
(C.C.P.A. 1982) (the configuration of a spray nozzle).
65. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768-69.
66. This may be accomplished if the trade dress has acquired secondary meaning in the market,
see supra text accompanying notes 41-44, or if the trade dress is inherently distinctive, see supra text
accompanying notes 52-55. See also infra text accompanying note 77.
67. There is a split of authority regarding this element. The Third Circuit for instance, makes
non-functionality an element of the cause of action. See Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg.
Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628, 633-34 (3d Cir. 1992); similarly, the Ninth Circuit also requires that a
claimant show non-functionality as an element of the prima facie case. See, e.g., Clamp Mfg. v. Enco
Mfg., 870 F.2d 512 (9th Cir. 1989). On the other hand, other jurisdictions consider non-functionality
an affirmative defense. See Abbott Labs. v. Mead Johnson & Co., 971 F.2d 6, 20 (7th Cir. 1992).
68. Likelihood of confusion refers to the likelihood that "an appreciable number of ordinarily
prudent buyers [will] be misled, or indeed simply confused, as to the source of the goods in ques-
tion." Lois Sportswear v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 871 (2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Thompson
Medical Co. v. Pfizer, Inc., 753 F.2d. 208, 213 (2d Cir. 1985)).
Likelihood of confusion is also a central element in a claim for trademark infringement under §
32 of the Lanham Act ("use... of a registered mark [that] is likely to cause confusion"), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1114(l)(a).
69. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 3.0111], at 3-2 (Rel. 1, 12193).
70. Id.
71. 505 U.S. 763 (1992).
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distinctiveness element in an infringement claim of unregistered trade dress.'
The influential Second Circuit required a showing of acquired secondary mean-
ing,73 whereas the Fifth Circuit allowed section 43(a) protection based on a
finding of inherent distinctiveness alone, without proof of secondary meaning.74
When Two Pesos was tried in front of a jury in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, the jury found that: 1) the trade dress of a Mexican
restaurant was non-functional; 2) it was inherently distinctive; 3) it had not ac-
quired secondary meaning; and 4) a competitor's alleged infringement caused a
likelihood of confusion.75 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the trade
dress was inherently distinctive and held that because it was inherently distinc-
tive it did not require a showing of secondary meaning.76 The Supreme Court
favored the Fifth Circuit's approach and held that a showing of secondary mean-
ing is not required when the trade dress is deemed inherently distinctive. The
Court stated the general principle for determining whether a mark rises to the
level of distinctiveness warranting protection under section 43(a) as follows: "an
identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected if it is either (1)
inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary mean-
ing . . . [however,] eligibility for protection . . . depends on
nonfunctionality. ' s The Court explained that in the absence of a textual basis
for differing treatment, the protection given to an inherently distinctive verbal or
symbolic trademark, applied equally to inherently distinctive trade dress. 9 In
essence, the majority's opinion found that trade dress and trademarks were legal
equivalents." In eliminating the need to obtain secondary meaning, the Court
reasoned that anti-competitive effects were foreclosed, especially when the bur-
den of proving market perception fell on small new enterprises seeking to gain
access to the market.8' The Court also feared that competitors would appropriate
an inherently distinctive trade dress that a new producer had created for a specif-
ic market but had not yet had the time to build secondary meaning or expand
into new markets.82 The Court's decision sparked much commentary not only
because it removed the reliance placed on the public's perception of a product's
72. Id. at 767.
73. See, e.g., Stormy Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc. 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987). See gener-
ally Joan L. Dillon, Two Pesos: More Interesting for What It Does Not Decide, 83 IRADEMARK REP.
77, 77 n.5 (1993) (stating that the Third, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, along with the Second Circuit,
required proof of secondary meaning in order to protect trade dress).
74. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 772-73 (stating that the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits joined the Fifth
Circuit in not requiring proof of secondary meaning when a trade dress is inherently distinctive). See,
e.g., Chevron Chem. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1981).
75. Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991).
76. Id.
77. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 773-74.
78. Il at 769 (citations omitted).
79. Id. at 774. Therefore, the Court found that a trade dress may be just as inherently distinctive
as an inherently distinctive verbal mark, such as KODAK or EXXON.
80. Dillon, supra note 73, at 85.
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trade dress, but most importantly because it did so without giving any guidance
as to what constitutes inherently distinctive trade dress. 3
C. Case Law Developments of Product Configuration as Trade Dress
As stated above, the term "configuration" refers to the three-dimensional
characteristics of a product. Among the various types of trade dress, the most
similar to product configuration is the shape of the container which holds the
product. However, the shape of a product container differs from the product
configuration because the latter embodies the product itself, whereas the shape of
the product container merely embodies the trappings that surround the product.
On the other hand, the shape of a product container is a type of product packag-
ing, which trademark law has traditionally considered trade dress. Under this
view, courts have protected product containers as trade dress since the mid-six-
ties! 4
A decade later, in Truck Equipment Service Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp.("TESCO")," the genesis of product configuration protection took place
when the Eighth Circuit held that the profile of a grain truck was protectable
trade dress under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. In TESCO, the manufacturer
of a bulk commodity semi-trailer known as the "Cornhusker 800" sought an
injunction to prevent a competitor from producing a truck with an exterior ap-
pearance identical to the "Cornhusker 800.'"" The court found that TESCO had
achieved secondary meaning in the market through sales during the preceding
eight years. It determined that the imitated exterior appearance did not serve a
utilitarian purpose and that this imitation, in fact, caused a likelihood of consum-
er confusion regarding the actual manufacturer. The court reasoned that manufac-
turers who invest time, money and effort in the development of goodwill and
positive reputation are protected by the Lanham Act from those who seek to
misappropriate those attributes" TESCO was the first case to prohibit the imita-
tion of three-dimensional product trade dress under unfair competition.8 Since
83. See, e.g., Melissa R. Gleiberman, Note, From Fast Cars to Fast Foods: Overbroad Protection
of Product Trade Dress Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 45 STAN. L. REv. 2037, 2041-44
(1993); Nancy Dwyer Chapman, Trade Dress Protection in the United States After the Supreme
Court's Decision in Two Pesos, 387 PLI/PAT 7, 13-16, 40-42 (1994); Dillon, supra note 73, at 82-
85; 1 MCCARTHY supra note 15, § 7.02[7][d], at 7-72 to 7-73 (Rel. 28, 11/92).
84. See In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925, 931 (C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding that the
design of a wine decanter could be registered as a trademark under § 2 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1052, because the term "trademark" is "one 'by which the goods of the applicant may be distin-
guished from the goods of others' and 'the mark used by the applicant has become distinctive of the
applicant's goods in commerce' ").
85. 536 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). See Gleiberman, supra note 83,
at 2039 (calling TESCO "the turning point" in expanding trade dress); see also Pegram, supra note 2,
at 11 (describing TESCO as a "major milestone in the development of federal trademark-type protec-
tion of product configuration").
86. TESCO, 536 F.2d at 1210.
87. Id. at 1215.
88. Gleiberman, supra note 83, at 2039.
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then, several circuit courts have provided protection to product configurations
under the unfair competition provision of the Lanham Act. 9
Generally, in dealing with the three elements of a claim for protection under
section 43(a) - distinctiveness, likelihood of confusion, and non-functionality -
the cases involving product configuration have dealt more with the issue of
whether or not a product configuration is functional, and less with the question
of whether a configuration is capable of distinguishing a source." Moreover,
due to the factual nature of the proof, it has been easier for claimants to show
that their product configurations have developed secondary meaning in the mar-
ket or that there is a likelihood of purchaser confusion than it has been to show
non-functionality. Furthermore, the doctrine of functionality has undergone sever-
al transformations, and the various jurisdictions do not agree on what makes a
feature functional." To date, this area of the law continues to be in flux. Prior
to Duraco, the Third Circuit decided a handful of cases dealing with product
configurations, yet they dealt with issues of functionality and secondary mean-
ing.' With regard to inherent distinctiveness in product configurations, only the
Federal Circuit had implied that product configurations may be inherently dis-
tinctive trade dress.93
89. See, e.g., Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993) (the design of faucet and
faucet lever); Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (the design of
a blender); Ferrari S.P.A. Esercizio Fabriche Automobile e Corse v. Roberts Motors Co., 944 F.2d
1235 (6th Cir. 1991) (the exterior of a sports automobile); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles,
Inc., 870 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1989) (the handles and fan wheel cage of an exercise bicycle); Stormy
Clime, Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc. 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1987) (the look of a rain jacket); Vaughan Mfg.
Co. v. Brikan Int'l, Inc., 812 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987) (the configuration of folding table);
LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1985) (the look of a bag); Keene Corp. v.
Paraflex Industries, Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981) (the configuration of a light fixture).
90. Pegram, supra note 2, at 5.
91. See, e.g., Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 775 (1992) (affirming the law
of the Fifth Circuit holding that "a design is legally functional, and thus unprotectable, if it is one of
a limited number of equally efficient options available to competitors"); Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives
Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10 (1982) (defining a feature as functional "if it is essential to the
use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article"); Schwinn Bicycle Co. v.
Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1189 (7th Cir. 1989) (defining a feature as functional if it is one
that it is "costly to design around or to do without," rather than one that is costly to have); Pagliero
v. Wallace China Co. 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) (defining a feature as functional if it is "an
important ingredient in the commercial success of the product" as opposed to something that primari-
ly indicates source identification).
92. Merchant & Evans v. Roosevelt Bldg. Prods. Co., 963 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1992); American
Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1986); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex
Industries, 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981).
93. Braun, Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815 (Fed Cir. 1992); Textron v. U.S.
Int'l Trade Comm., 753 F.2d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In re Morton-Norwich, 671 F.2d 1332 (Fed. Cir.
1982). See also Hanig & Co. v. Fisher & Co., No. 92 C1779, 1994 WL 97758 at *4 (N.D. f11. Mar.
24, 1994); Remcraft Lighting v. Maxim Lighting, 706 F. Supp. 855 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
The Eleventh Circuit, however, had addressed the issue of inherent distinctiveness as it relates
to traditional forms of trade dress, such as packaging and overall look. The court articulated a three-
part test in Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983), but it was
inconsistently applied. A few years later, the Eleventh Circuit utilized a different test, applying to
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Recently, in Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc.,94 the Seventh Circuit held that the
configurations of a faucet and faucet lever were subject to trademark registration
and protection under the Lanham Act. This case began when Kohler, a plumbing
manufacturer, sought review of a Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ('TTAB")
decision that permitted Moen, its competitor, to register as trademarks the de-
signs of a faucet and a faucet lever. Kohler argued that a product design could
not be registered as a trademark under the statutory definition of section 45 of
the Lanham Act;" however, it did not challenge the findings of acquired sec-
ondary meaning and non-functionality.9 The District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois upheld the TrAB's decision. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit
affirmed. The court first addressed the threshold issue of whether the statutory
definition of "trademark" included product configurations under section 45 of the
Lanham Act. In responding to this question, the court cited the Senate Report
that accompanied the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, confirming that
product configurations were not excluded from the definition of trademarks.97
Although the resolution of this point is notable, the true significance of this case
lies in the court's decision regarding the following issues: 1) whether the reg-
istration of a product configuration as a trademark conflicted with the patent law
because it was the equivalent of a perpetual patent; and 2) whether such regis-
tration was anti-competitive, inhibiting product development and precluding the
use of configurations resembling registered ones. The court responded in the
negative to both questions.
In response to the first inquiry, the court explained that the various character-
istics of a product can be protected simultaneously or successively by more than
one of the statutory schemes of intellectual property.98 Kohler contended that
Moen's unpatented product configurations were not protectable under the
Lanham Act because unpatented designs must remain in the public domain. The
court rejected Kohler's argument based on the Supreme Court precedent in the
Sears9ICompcotu IBonito Boats'°' line of cases."2 The court reasoned that
trade dress the same analysis as to trademarks, see 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 7.0217], at 7-72
(Rel. 28, 11/92). See also discussion in Part Il.A.
94. 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) ("The term 'trademark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof...
96. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 633.
97. Id. at 636.
98. Id. at 638.
99. Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
100. Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
101. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
102. In Sears and its companion case Compco, the Supreme Court held that state unfair competi-
tion laws could not prevent the imitation of product configurations that would otherwise be unprotect-
ed under federal patent law. Sears involved the design of a pole lamp and Compco the design of a
ceiling light fixture. In both cases, the lower courts upheld the state unfair competition statute and
enjoined competitors from imitating the products. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court deci-
sions and held that federal patent law preempted the state statute. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco,
376 U.S. at 237-38. The Supreme Court explained that when a design was not entitled to federal
19961
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SearslCompcolBonito Boats stood for the proposition that "state[ ] unfair com-
petition laws could not extend patent-like protection to otherwise unprotected
designs because such protection conflicted with the federal policy expressed in
the patent clause and patent laws of generally free trade in unpatented design and
utilitarian concepts."' 3 The court also offered the often-cited Compco "textual
hook" that states that a design may be freely copied if the design is "not entitled
to a design patent 'or other federal statutory protection.' "o Then, the court
buttressed its position by citing several cases that held that Sears and Compco do
not prohibit protection for product configurations under the Lanham Act. 5 Fi-
nally, the court concluded that the goals of the Lanham Act and the nature of the
protection given did not approximate the broad, limitless patent-like state laws
that the Supreme Court held impermissible in Sears, Compco, and Bonito
Boats."o
The court then addressed the second inquiry: whether registration of product
configurations was anti-competitive, thus inhibiting product development. The
court stated that protection of product configurations would undermine product
development only if the foundational purposes of trademark and patent law were
ignored."r° The court reasoned that in the same manner that patent law encour-
ages discovery and innovation in "[s]cience and the useful [a]rts," the economic
rewards of trademark law encourage producers to discover and innovate their
identifying names, symbols, or marketing techniques in order to exclude others
from imitating such marks."° Moreover, the court stated that the Supreme
Court in Bonito Boats explained that congressional adoption of section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act and the continued existence of federal patent law and unfair
competition law "were 'affirmative indications' that unfair competition law is
protection, the design must remain in the public domain where the public was at liberty to copy it
without restrictions from state laws. The Court explained that to do otherwise would thwart one of
the purposes of patent law, which is to encourage and reward invention, and would stifle fair compe-
tition in the marketplace. The Supreme Court concluded that state unfair competition laws were pre-
empted by the purposes of the federal patent statute. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231-32; Compco, 376 U.S. at
237-38. See also Pegram, supra note 2, at 7 (observing that at the time Sears and Compco were
decided it seemed that product configurations could not be protected under any unfair competition
law) (emphasis added).
Twenty five years later, the Supreme Court affirmed Sears and Compco in Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), by holding that a Florida law that protected designs
that federal patent law would not protect was preempted. The Bonito Boats Court confirmed a
competitor's right to copy as being a necessary part of invention and competition in the market.
Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. The Court explained that only Congress could grant temporary mo-
nopolies by authorizing the issuance of patents. Id. (citing Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966)).
103. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 639 (citing Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 152-54).
104. Id. at 640 (citing Compco, 376 U.S. at 238) (emphasis added). In Compco the Supreme Court
stated that if a design was not entitled to a "design patent or other federal statutory protection," the
public was free to copy it. Compco, 376 U.S. at 238 (emphasis added).
105. Kohler, 12 F.3d at 640.
106. Id. at 636-44.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 643.
[Vol. VI:275
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'consistent with the [policy] balance struck by the patent laws.' ""o Finally, the
court concluded that there was "no unavoidable conflict between the patent law
and the federal trademark law as applied to product configurations" and affirmed
the registration of Moen's faucet and lever designs as trademarks."'
While the Supreme Court has viewed the subject of product configurations
from the broader perspective of federal preemption, the majority of lower courts
have focused primarily on issues of functionality and secondary meaning. A
recent study of registration and infringement cases during the last thirty years
concludes that product configurations have been found inherently distinctive in
only a minority of cases."' The overwhelming majority of registrations and
litigated cases required proof of secondary meaning in order to receive protec-
tion."2 In fact, in only two out of 106 reported decisions did courts find that
product configurations were inherently distinctive and did not require proof of
secondary meaning."' For instance, although the Seventh Circuit extended
trademark protection to Moen's faucet and lever designs, the court flatly denied
that a product configuration could ever be inherently distinctive." 4 Presumably,
the question of distinctiveness in product configurations has not been contested
because of the law's reliance on proof of secondary meaning. However, as a
result of Two Pesos, the issue in product configuration cases became whether the
configuration of a product could ever constitute inherently distinctive trade dress
without having to prove that it had acquired secondary meaning in the market.
The Third Circuit in Duraco held that a product configuration in certain cases
can be inherently distinctive trade dress, thus expanding the scope of trademark
law into the realm of product design.
11. DuRAco PRODUCTS, INC. V. JOY PLASTICS ENTERPRISES'' 5
A. Facts and Procedural History
This case involved a manufacturer of plastic planters ("Duraco") that sought
to enjoin its competitor ("Joy") from allegedly infringing Duraco's trade dress
under a section 43(a) claim. Duraco's most profitable garden product was a line
of plastic planters in the shape of Grecian urns sold to large discount stores." 6
109. Id. at 644 (citing Bonito Boats, 486 U.S. at 166).
110. Id.
111. Lawrence E. Evans, Jr. & Elizabeth A. Hoover, Protection of Product Configurations Under
the Lanham Act, I U. BALT. INTELL PRop. LJ. 126 (1993).
112. Id. at 133-38.
113. Id. at 136 n.104 (citing Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int'l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346 (7th Cir. 1987)
(configuration of folding table); and Remcraft Lighting Prods. v. Maxim Lighting, Inc., 706 F. Supp.
855 (S.D. Fla. 1989) (configuration of lamp)).
114. Kohler, 12 F.3d 632, 641 n.11 (7th Cir. 1993)("[A] product's shape is never inherently dis-
tinctive:). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §16 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
2, 1990) ("Product designs are.., not considered inherently distinctive; such designs are only
protectable upon proof of secondary meaning.:).
115. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir. 1994).
116. Id. at 1434.
19961
13
Shiffrin: The Third Circuit's New Test Provides an Alternative to Urning Se
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW
The planters were commercially successful, according to Duraco, because of the
careful combination of ornamental features creating an illusion of marble, ce-
ment, or stone construction." 7 Joy created a line of plastic urns strikingly simi-
lar to Duraco's."' Joy's urns had a deeper bowl, to hold more water and soil
for enhanced root development, and a lower center of gravity, to avoid tip-
ping." 9 Both planters had similar construction: a top "bowl" section that
snapped at a joint onto a lower "base" section and an "egg and dart" pattern on
the lips of the bowls. 2 However, there were also differences in the planters:
Duraco urns had a smoother look, while the Joy planters appeared to have sharp
uneven edges and poor color;' the side of Duraco's bowls were curved while
Joy's were straight; and Duraco had higher fluting on the bowl and pedestal and
a wider "landing" on the lip between each flute.'
2
Duraco inadvertently discovered Joy's competition when Duraco's chief exec-
utive officer came across a Joy urn at a retail store and purchased it thinking it
was a defective Duraco urn."2 Alleging trade dress infringement, Duraco
sought a preliminary injunction 24 in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Pennsylvania,"m claiming that the total composition of the
classical elements, not the individual elements, embodied in its urns merited
trade dress protection.'26 In addition, Duraco claimed that Joy need not copy its
urns in order to compete effectively, and that other manufacturers had created
designs significantly different from Duraco's urns. 2 As support for its allega-
tions, Duraco submitted several alternate designs that interpreted the same ele-
ments found in its neoclassically styled urns that could effectively compete in the
market without infringing on Duraco's trade dress.'28
In determining whether to grant Duraco a preliminary injunction, the district
court first addressed the issue of Duraco's probability of success on the mer-
its.'29 The court evaluated the urns' trade dress according to the distinctiveness
spectrum and found the designs to be descriptive at best, and thus rejected
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1435.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1435-36.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. ld. at 1436.
124. Four factors must be analyzed in considering a motion for preliminary injunction under FED.
R. Civ. P. 65: 1) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; 2) the threat of irreparable
harm to plaintiff if the injunction is not granted; 3) the balance between harm to plaintiff and the
injury that granting the injunction would inflict on defendant; and 4) the public interest. Duraco, 822
F. Supp. at 1208 (citing American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136, 1140
(3d Cir. 1986)).
125. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 822 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
126. Duraco, 822 F. Supp. at 1208.
127. Id. at 1207.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1208-10.
[Vol. VI:275
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Duraco's claim of distinctiveness.' The court also found that secondary mean-
ing had not been achieved because the evidence did not show that purchasers
perceived that the plastic urns emanated from a particular source.' Further,
the court found 4he design functional because all the elements present in the
planter were nec6ssary to depict a classically styled urn made of alabaster."'
Moreover, the cotirt did not find a likelihood of consumer confusion because
consumers were not interested in the identity of the manufacturer and because
there was no showing of actual consumer confusion.'33 Based on these factors,
the court found tlt Duraco was unlikely to prevail on the merits of its claim.
Second, the oourt considered the threat of irreparable harm to Duraco."'
Because Duraco's sales levels had not suffered since Joy's urns entered the mar-
ket, the court held, that there was a minimal threat of harm. 35 Next, the court
weighed the harnms , to the parties and found that the harm to Joy would be great-
er if the injunction were issued because Joy relied heavily on the sale of its urns,
whereas Duraeo had other product lines in the market.'36 Lastly, the court held
that Duraco had failed to establish that granting the injunction would benefit the
public since there was no showing of consumer confusion due to Joy's competi-
tion.'37 Therefore, the court denied Duraco's motion for a preliminary injunc-
tion, and as a result, Duraco appealed.
B. The Third Circuit's Opinion
In affirming the district court's decision, the Third Circuit began its analysis
by rejecting the application of the distinctiveness categories to trade dress in the
configuration of a pro-duct.'" The court explained that the configuration of a
product is not a symbol that associates the signifier (the trademark or trade
dress) to the signified (the product); therefore, a product configuration, constitut-
ing a part of the product, has no signifying relationship to itself.'39 The court
further stated that a product configuration is neither descriptive or suggestive of
the product, nor is it arbitrary or generic with regard to it: the configuration
simply is the product.'" Moreover, the court explained that the reasons behind
the categories - the identifying relationship between the mark and the product
and the degree to which it identifies the product - were not applicable to the
product itself.'








138. Duraco Prods., Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enters., 40 F.3d 1431, 1440 (3d Cir. 1994).
139. Id. at 1440-41.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1441.
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Judge Becker, who wrote the majority opinion for the Third Circuit, explained
that the competition-based rationales employed by the Supreme Court in Two
Pesos supported the finding that trade dress in product configurations may be
considered inherently distinctive under very narrow circumstances. 42 However,
because Congress has been reluctant to legislate product design protection other
than through the limited application of patent and copyright law, courts must
exercise extreme caution in finding product configurations as inherently distinc-
tive trade dress.'43 Therefore, the court carefully emphasized that it was not the
role of the judiciary to undermine congressional intent not to grant permanent
monopolies to product configurations by reading section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act expansively.
Next, the court analyzed the goal of unfair competition law: the promotion of
robust competition by proscribing only those practices that are unfair, such as
deceiving consumers and trading off another's goodwill.'" The court explained
that the proper approach to inherent distinctiveness must be to acknowledge that
unfair competition law allows the copying of desirable designs that have not
obtained secondary meaning but prohibits the copying of designs that represent
the source of goods.45 Applying these principles, and following Two Pesos, the
court reasoned that: 1) certain product configurations identify the product's
source for the consumer's benefit; 2) unprivileged imitation of those product
configurations may deceive purchasers; and 3) producers of those product con-
figurations should not be placed in the position of losing their competitive status
or risking "theft" of their trade dress by having to wait until their products attain
secondary meaning.'"
Announcing its new test for inherently distinctive trade dress in product con-
figuration, the court stated: "[T]o be inherently distinctive, a product configura-
tion - comprising a product feature or some particular combination or arrange-
ment of product features - for which Lanham Act protection is sought must be:
[1)] unusual and memorable; [2)] conceptually separable from the product; and
[3)] likely to serve primarily as a designator of origin of the product."'" The
court then applied this test to the facts and concluded that Duraco's urns were
not inherently distinctive nor had they acquired distinctiveness through secondary
meaning in the market." First, the court stated that while Duraco's planters
had features different from its competitors, distinguishability alone could not rise
to the level of memorability and unusualness required. 49 However, the court
also observed that it could not rule out that Duraco's planters might have been
considered memorable and unusual at the time when Joy introduced its planters
142. Id. at 1446.
143. Id. at 1446-47.
144. Id. at 1448.
145. Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1448-49.
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in the market."s Second, the court found that Duraco's trade dress alleged in
the configuration of its urns was not conceptually separable from the product it-
self.' The elements that Duraco sought to protect, the look of classic elements
made of marble or stone, constituted part of the overall product and could not be
thought of separately from the planter.'52 Lastly, the court believed that con-
sumers would find the planter configuration attractive but would not necessarily
read its trade dress as an indicator of source.'53 The evidence presented, the
court observed, established that Duraco aimed to give its urns the impression of
marble, stone, or cement, not to have those elements identify Duraco as the urns'
source.1
54
Having determined that Duraco's urns were not inherently distinctive, the
court proceeded to examine the factors relevant in establishing secondary mean-
ing, namely consumer surveys, advertising, and length and exclusivity of use.1
55
The court concluded that Duraco's surveys did not reflect that purchasers associ-
ated the urns with a particular source, but instead reflected that consumers sim-
ply purchased the urns because they found them desirable. 56 Also, the court
pointed out that Joy's attempts to copy Duraco's urns were not probative of
secondary meaning because Joy may have been capitalizing on the desirability of
the urns' configuration.' As to its advertising, the court noted that Duraco had
not emphasized its trade dress in its advertisements. Lastly, the court observed
that Duraco sold its urns for five years, an insufficient length of time to develop
a heavy inference of consumer association with a particular source. 5 1 The court
concluded that having failed to show that the trade dress was inherently distinc-
tive, either through inherent distinctiveness or acquired secondary meaning,
Duraco failed to establish likelihood of success in its Lanham Act claim.
159
Thus, the court affirmed the district court's order denying Duraco's motion for
preliminary injunction."
I. ANALYsis
When a word, symbol, or device serves as an informational tool to the pur-
chaser, thereby preventing confusion and deception and protecting the goodwill
of the producer, this word, symbol, or device may merit protection under the
Lanham Act.' However, the case law shows that almost all product configura-
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1451-52.
153. Id. at 1452.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1452-53.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1453-54.
159. Id. at 1454.
160. Id.
161. Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. See also text accompanying supra notes 11-14.
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tions that have received protection are those configurations that had developed
secondary meaning in the market. 6 The difficult issue facing the court in
Duraco was whether a product configuration could be inherently distinctive at
the outset and, in accordance with Two Pesos doctrine, not be required to earn
secondary meaning in the market. In general, the Duraco court followed the
Supreme Court's reasoning in Two Pesos, yet it placed restrictions on attaining
protection. Although it seems that product configurations under Duraco would
enjoy broad protection, attaching immediately upon entry into the market, the
application of the court's new test yields a contrary result. The effect of Duraco
is that very few product configurations will meet the high threshold laid out by
the court. Therefore, those seeking protection will generally have to prove sec-
ondary meaning in the market, placing the thrust of product configuration protec-
tion on the public's perception, a proposition on which trademark law has histor-
ically relied.
Although the court has properly created guidelines for raising the threshold
for finding inherently distinctive product configurations - unusualness and
memorability, conceptual separability, and likelihood of serving primarily as
source designator - Duraco could be criticized for several reasons. First, those
who seek congressional action for the protection of industrial designs may point
out that the court's new test merely extends the intuitive nature of the current
judicial approach to trade dress, thereby preventing the desired protection. Sec-
ond, traditionalists may argue that the court's rejection of the distinctiveness
categories is unwarranted because product configurations should be treated as
other forms of trade dress. Finally, those who oppose a broad reading of section
43(a) to include product configurations as protectable trade dress would argue
that such protection results in limitless monopolies conflicting with other intel-
lectual property schemes, and that purchasers do not rely on the configuration of
a product for source indicativeness.
A. The New Test Lacks the Intuitiveness of the Current Eyeball Test
In determining whether words are inherently distinctive, courts usually consult
dictionaries to evaluate the meaning and usage of the words. 63 As part of the
analysis, courts categorize the words as arbitrary, fanciful, suggestive, descrip-
tive, or generic.'" However, with regard to trade dress, there are no dictionar-
ies to which courts can refer, and little more than the "eye-ball test" to ap-
ply. " Professor Brown crystallized the risks involved in instinctively "eye-
162. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
163. 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 7.02 [7][d], 7-72 to 7-73 (Rel. 28, 11/92).
164. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
165. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 7.02 [7][d], 7-72 to 7-73 (Rel. 28, 11/92). In a significant
step in trade dress protection, the Eleventh Circuit articulated a three-part test for finding inherently
distinctive trade dress in Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 857 (11th Cir.
1983) relying on Seabrook Foods, Inc. v. Bar-Well Foods, Ltd., 568 F.2d 1342, 1344 (C.C.P.A.
1977); however, the court did not consistently apply it. See also 1 MCCARTRY, supra note 15, §
8.02[4], at 8-18.1 (Rel. 3, 12/94) (summarizing the Eleventh Circuit's three-part test as "merely dif-
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balling" trade dress in the absence of an analytical structure:
[TMo say that the overall design of a useful article is inherently distinctive of a
particular source just by examining it and perhaps dissecting it, seems to [be] an
impermissible exercise of intuitive judging. It substitutes an impression that the
design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something, for the proofs of
association with a source, gained in the market-place, that add up to a showing
of secondary meaning.'"
The intuitive exercise of "eye-balling" is precisely the reason why the court
formulated a set of standards for determining whether trade dress, at least in the
case of a product configuration, may be inherently distinctive. The court in
Duraco observes the need for a separate test for product configurations because
product configurations are fundamentally different from other forms of trade
dress. However, the real reason for the court's new test is to curtail the subjec-
tive use of the eyeball test, which courts currently apply to determine the inher-
ent distinctiveness of a product's trade dress. More specifically, Duraco's test
responds to the concern about the application of the eyeball test when the objec-
tive proof of secondary meaning is no longer required in accordance with Two
Pesos.'67 Therefore, by replacing the eyeball test with a structure of high
threshold elements, product configurations will be forced to earn secondary
meaning in the market before finding protection under trademark law. Curiously,
when the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the issue of trade dress
distinctiveness in Two Pesos, the Court was silent about what constitutes inher-
ently distinctive trade dress. The court's new test seems to be an awaited devel-
opment in trademark law. Duraco recognizes two things: first, there may be
instances where the three-dimensional features of a product do symbolize source
at the outset, and protection should be given only after conducting an analytical
evaluation of the particular product configuration; and second, it affirms the
reliance placed on the objectivity of acquired distinctiveness.
In comparison with the eye-ball determination, the elements in the court's
new test - unusualness and memorability; conceptual separability; and the like-
lihood of serving primarily as source designator - provide a path to an objective
approach to the inquiry of distinctiveness. The court's first requirement, unusual-
ness and memorability, echo trademark law's intellectual property siblings, copy-
right law and patent law. Copyright law requires originality'61 and patent law
ferent ways to ask whether the design, shape or combination of elements is so unique, unusual or
unexpected in this market that one can assume without proof that it will automatically be perceived
by customers as an indicia of origin"). Only a few years after the Eleventh Circuit formulated the
Brooks Shoe test, the court abandoned it and applied a different test, applying to trade dress the tradi-
tional distinctiveness categories used for trademarks. I MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 7.0217], at 7-72.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court did not mention the Eleventh Circuit's test in its determination of
inherent distinctiveness in Two Pesos. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 7.0217], at 7-73.
166. Brown, supra note 3, at 1380.
167. See Dillon, supra note 73, at 89 ("[Two Pesos] appears to stand for the proposition that the
subjective or 'eyeball' test of distinctiveness should outweigh the objective or 'empirical evidence'
test of acquired distinctiveness or secondary meaning.").
168. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
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calls for novelty and non-obviousness."6 Duraco's unusualness and memorabil-
ity require the particular three-dimensional feature or combination of features to
be of a certain nature so that consumers are able to recognize in it something
other than the product. The particular configuration has to be sufficiently unique
to remain in the purchasers' minds. As consumers perceive the unusual and
memorable configuration, they perceive a message. This message is the essence
of trademark; it is the indication of source or sponsorship. Absent unusualness
and memorability, the configuration may not be distinctive or strong enough to
provide the information necessary to protect both the producer's goodwill and the
consumer from confusion. The requirement of unusualness and memorability
excludes from protection those designs that are customary in the industry, or
those that are commonplace in the particular market at issue. This first element
resembles the exclusion of generic and descriptive marks under the traditional
distinctiveness spectrum.
The second element, conceptual separability, requires the purchaser to be able
to mentally separate the merchandise itself from the three-dimensional features
that strictly perform the symbolic function of signifying source. The requirement
of conceptual separability is reminiscent of copyright protection for "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works."'' 0 Under copyright law, conceptual separability
refers to the ability to isolate the aesthetic characteristics of a product from its
utilitarian aspects. 7' However, the need for conceptual separability under trade
dress law stems from the fact that a configuration will not be deemed inherently
distinctive if it cannot effectively identify its source to consumers.' To identi-
fy a product's source, a purchaser must conceptually perceive the particular
configuration separately from the utilitarian and ornamental aspects of the prod-
uct.'73 In perceiving the product configuration, the purchaser must be able to
assess its symbolic meaning, which is to distinguish and designate source or
sponsorship. If the purchaser views the product configuration as merely part of
the product itself, as either an ornamental or a functional component, then it does
not merit protection and competitors should be free to imitate the configuration.
It may be argued that the requirement of conceptual separability seeks to encour-
age the creation of attractive configurations, a goal inconsistent with the estab-
lished purposes of the Lanham Act. However, as stated above, this element
merely requires that certain three-dimensional features of the product be per-
ceived separately, to the extent that they effectively convey information to con-
169. To be patentable, a design or invention must be both "novel" and "not obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said art pertains." 35 U.S.C
§§ 102, 103 (1994).
170. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
171. For a thoughtful analysis of conceptual separability in copyright law, see Brandir Int'l, Inc., v.
Cascade Pacific Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) (Conceptual separability exists
"where design elements can be identified as reflecting artistic judgement exercised independently of
functional influences").
172. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1449.
173. Although the court does not mention physical separability, a three-dimensional feature which
is physically separable presumably meets the requirement of conceptual separability.
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sumers, regardless of whether or not such three-dimensional features are at-
tractive.""
The last element of the court's test, the likelihood to serve primarily as source
indicator, also has an objective component. This element has grounding in tradi-
tional unfair competition law, and it refers to the reaction of the consuming
public. In the same vein as the likelihood of confusion under sections 32 or 43(a)
of the Lanham Act,'75 this requirement indirectly places the consumer, one of
the targets of protection, in the adjudication of legal protection. Accordingly, this
element requires more than the fact finder's speculation on how consumers are
likely to react in the future. Courts may use objective evidentiary considerations,
such as consumer surveys, to determine likely consumer reaction to a product. A
sampling of purchasers can determine whether others similarly situated will
perceive a particular configuration as an indicator of source. In an economy
where Americans are bombarded daily with hundreds of products through news-
papers, magazines, junk mail, billboards, radio, television, and the Internet, it is
important to consider how consumers are likely to perceive the messages that
producers attempt to transmit to them. When a mark or trade dress does not
immediately and directly indicate its source, trademark law has historically relied
on consumers actual impressions.'76 Yet, when a particular feature is able to
send its message and consumers immediately read it, a producer should be able
to protect that property right in the trade dress, without the risk of theft or anti-
competitive effects.
B. Rejection of the Trademark Categories
Critics of Duraco could argue that the court's new test is an erratic deviation
from the well-established distinctiveness spectrum, one of the cornerstones of
trademark law."7 In fact, the court's explicit rejection of the traditional distinc-
tiveness categories highlights the fundamental difference between product config-
urations and other types of trade dress. The distinctiveness categories represent
gradations in the relationship created between the identifying mark and the prod-
uct, and the degree to which the mark identifies the product.' These grada-
tions cannot be said to take place between the product and the configuration of
the product."7 A product configuration is not descriptive or suggestive of the
product, nor is it arbitrary or generic with regard to it: the configuration simply
174. Critics of Duraco may note that transposition of conceptual separability from copyright law
carries the current doctrinal debates taking place in the area of copyright law into trademark law. See
generally, Shira Perlutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Design of Useful Articles, 37
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 339 (1990) (stating that "[o]ne of the most difficult issues arising under the
Copyright Act is the copyrightability of useful articles").
175. See text accompanying supra notes 56-58.
176. Dratler, supra note 22, at 896-97.
177. See text accompanying supra notes 35-38.
178. See supra notes 33-49 and accompanying text.
179. Duraco, 40 F.3d at 1440-41.
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is the product.' ° Despite the fact that the categorization of marks along the dis-
tinctiveness spectrum has been firmly established by the case law, its application
to product configurations has been questioned by commentators' and at least
one court. 2 Furthermore, the four categories of distinctiveness - generic, de-
scriptive, suggestive, and arbitrary or fanciful - break down into two major
groups: those that are not inherently distinctive marks, and those that are inher-
ently distinctive marks. Marks that are suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful are
deemed inherently distinctive and thus fall under the second group. What Duraco
does is provide a different method of classifying product configuration trade
dress into the equivalent of the second group of marks. As stated above, an
alternate method was necessary because of the unique nature of product configu-
ration trade dress.
C. The Risk of Granting a Limitless Monopoly
Some commentators claim that trademark law is being used as a back door to
federally permissible monopolies because the Constitution provides for protection
"for limited times,"'8 3 through copyright and patent law, and Congress has con-
tinuously refused to extend protection to industrial designs." 4 Trademark law,
however, does not specify a time limitation; the protection continues so long as
the mark continues to be used in commerce.' The Duraco court anticipated
this challenge and reasoned that the purposes behind the Lanham Act justify
extending protection to the configuration of a product when it acts as source
designator. The court recognized that this may be an easy proposition when
traditional marks are involved, but it becomes a more difficult question when
product configurations are involved because of issues of perception and function-
ality. This difficulty coupled with the limitless nature of protection under trade-
180. Id.
181. Gleiberman, supra note 83, at 2043 (stating that an appreciation of the basic differences be-
tween words, symbols and even product packaging from product configurations illustrates the need
for varying legal standards); Hoffman, supra note 37, at 222 ("The [trademark distinctiveness] cate-
gories do not fit trade dress considerations very well."); Dratler, supra note 22, at 938 (stating that
some reformulation is required for the protection of distinctive product configurations because the
doctrine of distinctiveness was developed to be applied to verbal marks).
182. Hanig & Co. v. Fisher & Co., No. 92 C1779, 1994 WL 97758, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 24,
1994) (arguing that the distinctiveness categories "break down when applied to product design" and
"[p]erhaps product design should not be considered trade dress at all").
183. "Congress shall have the Power... to promote the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,
by securing for limited times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also Reichman, supra note 1, at 387 (stating
that in the last two decades the federal district courts have been reading § 43(a) of the Lanham Act
expansively, transforming this unfair competition provision into judge-made design law).
184. Brown, supra note 3, at 1395-1404 (describing several proposals presented to Congress dur-
ing most of this century).
185. Lanham Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C § 1051(a)(1)(A) ("The owner of a trademark used in commerce
may apply to register his or her trademark... [bly filing ... a written application... specify-
ing ... the date of applicant's first use of the mark.... the mode or manner in which the mark is
used... including a statement.., that the mark is in use in commerce .... ").
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mark law are precisely the reasons why the court advised the strict application of
its new guidelines.
In line with Two Pesos, the Duraco court was concerned with the anti-com-
petitive effects that would result from the misappropriation of a producer's new
trade dress and the burden on start-up businesses. The court elevated the poten-
tial property right of the trademark owner over its competitors' right to imitate in
an effort to prevent consumer confusion."6 Also, the decision took into account
that competitive interests in copying three-dimensional features of products have
a built-in protection in the requirement of non-functionality. If a configuration is
found to be functional, under any of the doctrine's definitions, the configuration
will not be protected by section 43(a).
D. The Public's Perception
An important issue regarding trade dress in product configuration is whether
purchasers in fact read a source indicator in the product configuration, or wheth-
er purchasers perceive the configuration as mere ornamentation.' T When pur-
chasers associate the product configuration with the product's maker or sponsor,
the configuration performs as a source indicator, therefore falling under the pro-
tection of the Lanham Act. On the other hand, if consumers view the config-
uration simply as an aesthetic feature of the product, none of the Lanham Act
purposes would be furthered by granting protection to those features. By relying
heavily on the rationale of Two Pesos, the Duraco court has done two things:
first, it assumed as fact that the reasonable prudent purchaser is able to read a
source indicator in the configuration of a product; and second, the court attaches
protection to a trade dress as soon as it enters commerce, without the buttressing
of secondary meaning.
Trademarks, such as words and symbols, are simpler to evaluate as source
indicators than traditional trade dress. Trade dress, such as a product's packaging
or its "overall look," may be more troublesome to assess. For instance, there
may be several components to evaluate, such as colors, textures, graphics, and
shapes. Moreover, functionality issues are likely to arise, such as the use of a
certain wrapping to protect the product from damage. Unlike a mark or pack-
aging, a product configuration does not generally have the informational capabil-
ities that a symbol of even the "overall look" approach has. The configuration
does not speak of the product, generally it simply is the product. 8 The average
consumer does not normally associate the configuration of a product as an indi-
cator of the product's source, until the consumer is educated through advertise-
ment and use."89 The consumer might view the feature as either functional or as
mere ornament. Consumers are drawn to products by what they see on the
product, namely its configuration, for aesthetic or utilitarian reasons. The court's
186. Gleiberman, supra note 83, at 2056.
187. Brown, supra note 3, at 1341.
188. Duraco, 40 F.3d 1431, 1441 (citing Dratler, supra note 22, at 309).
189. 1 McCARTHY, supra note 15, § 7.06, at 7-33 (Rel. 3, 12/94).
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decision counters these arguments by setting forth characteristics that consumers
can identify in a configuration that are intended to signify its source.
Lastly, the court goes to great lengths to advocate judicial restraint in expand-
ing section 43(a) and in applying this test because it realizes the potential for a
snowball effect. If courts construe Duraco's new test broadly, thus granting
protection liberally, legitimate competitors may be prohibited from engaging in
robust competition. By raising the threshold and advocating its narrow applica-
tion, the Duraco court seeks to limit the finding of inherently distinctive trade
dress in product configurations. Therefore, by creating standards for exceptional
findings of inherent distinctiveness, the court recognizes the appropriateness of
secondary meaning as the general rule for product configurations as trade
dress."'
CONCLUSION
The Lanham Act aims to protect both producers and consumers. When a
producer places a trademark or trade dress on the goods and services provided,
the Lanham Act protects the producer's goodwill embodied in the trademark or
trade dress. Similarly, the Lanham Act protects purchasers who rely on the trade-
mark or trade dress for information about the product's source. The court's hold-
ing in Duraco affirms these goals by setting standards under which a consumer's
perception of a product's trademark or trade dress is validated and, therefore, the
consumer's right to be free from confusion by unauthorized imitators is protect-
ed. Likewise, the producer's interest in protecting the inherently distinctive con-
figuration of a product is also given priority only when it meets certain require-
ments. Specifically, the new test for product configurations announced by the
Third Circuit held that a product configuration may be inherently distinctive
trade dress if it is: 1) unusual and memorable; 2) conceptually separable from the
product; and 3) likely to serve primarily as source designator. In the wake of
recent Supreme Court precedent, the Duraco court filled a gap that the Supreme
Court left unanswered, bringing order to an area of trademark law that has vexed
the federal lower courts and the intellectual property bar due to its continued
expansion. The new test established in Duraco by the Third Circuit provides an
objective structure to determine whether a producer who uses the configuration
of a product as its trade dress has met the exceptional circumstances under which
the product's trade dress is deemed inherently distinctive or whether the producer
must invest time and effort to develop secondary meaning in the market in order
to find protection under trademark law. In short, the court's new test is a much
awaited step in the development of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
Gracia Maria Shiffrin
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16 cmt. b (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1990); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 15, § 8.02[3], n.1 1-12. See also William Gaske, Note, Trade Dress
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